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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
HOWE RENTS CORPORATION,
Plaintif!-Respondent,
vs.

JOHN WORTHEN, dba Exotic
Swimming Pool Company,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

10583

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action at law based on a written contract of bailment for damage done to plaintiff's
equipment while in the possession of the defendant
as bailee thereof.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the lower court, sitting without a jury, and, after receiving in evidence
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the contract and the stipulations of counsel as,
the facts, judgment was granted to plaintiff. D.
f e~1dant made a motion to the lower court for a ne'.
trial, which motion was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmation of the judgment 1
the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff operates an equipment rental bmi
ness located at 2375 South State Street, Salt La];.
City, Utah. On August 4, 1962, at approximate!:
6 :00 P.M., the defendant came to plaintiff's businfr
establishment and leased from plaintiff a large rnor
tar mixer which was delivered to the defendant an
retained by him in his possession under his sole car
and keeping until August 6, 1962, at approxirnatfr
5 :00 P.M. ( R. 25, 26). Defendant, in connection wit:
the rental of the mortar mixer, signed and executt
a rental agreement, and paid a deposit on said rent:
in the amount of $50.00. The rental agreement, &
executed by defendant, stated in part:
1

"Lessee acknowledges receipt of tr
equipment in good working condition and rr
pair, and agrees to return it in as good cN
dition subject to reasonable wear and tea:
and L~ssee shall be liable for all damage to'
loss of the equipment regardless of cause ?nr
it shall have been returned to and rece1ptt
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fo1· by the Lessor. . . . None of the above
equipment ... shall ... be removed from the
county in which it was delivered to the lessee
except by prior written consent of lessor ... "
(Exh. P. 1)
On August 6, 1966, at approximately 5 :00 P.M.,
while defendant was traveling north on U. S. Highway 89 near Ogden, Weber County, Utah, the mortar
mixer became detached from defendant's vehicle,
orerturned and was damaged. This incident occurred
approximately 47 hours after defendant first gained
possession of the mortar mixer and outside of the
county in which it was delivered to the lessee.
The allegations set forth in the last three paragraphs of appellanfs Statement of Facts are not
included in the Findings of Fact of the lower court
(R. 25-27).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
A CONTRACT ALLOCATING THE RISK OF
LOSS OF A BAILED CHATTEL MAKING THE
BAILEE THE INSURER THEREOF DOES NOT
VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY AND IS ENFORCEABLE ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS.
A. The rights and obligations of parties to a
contract of bailment are determined by the provisions of the contract.
B. The contract provision in question does not
riolate public policy.
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. C. Defendant's liability with respect to i:
bailed chattel is explicitly stated in the contract.
POINT II
APPELLANT SEEKS ON APPEAL REL![
NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF REVIEW OFTH'
SUPREME COURT.
,
A. The granting or denial of a motion for
new trial is not a final judgment from which 2
appeal lies.
B. Plaintiff's negligence and the cause of da~
age to plaintiff's chattel are not issues before tn
Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A CONTRACT ALLOCATING THE RISKO!
LOSS OF A BAILED CHATTEL MAKING THf
BAILEE THE INSURER THEREOF DOES NO:
VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY AND IS ENFORCf
ABLE ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS.
A. The rights and obligations of parties to
contract of bailment are determined by the pror
sions of the contract. Plaintiff in this action is seel
ing to be indemnified for damage done to his rent'
equipment while it was in the possession of the Or
fondant bailee for a period of nearly 47 hours. Tn
defendant contended at the trial of this matter th~
any damage done to plaintiff's equipment was ?ro~
mately caused by plaintiff's own negligence ma
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taching the leased mortar mixer to defendant's
vehicle. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that
plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendant for
the damage done to plaintiff's mortar mixer, and
in so doing, assumed that plaintiff was negligent,
and that such negligence was the proximate cause
of the damage to the mixer, and, therefore necessarily held that the negligence of plaintiff, if any, would
constitute no defense to plaintiff's claim under the
terms of the agreement. (R. 26, 27)
Therefore, the only issue before the Court on
this appeal is: Is the provision in the contract of
bailment, placing absolute liability for damage to
the bailed chattel upon the appellant, enforceable?
The general rule is that the terms of a contract
of bailment determine the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties, and that while the care to be
exercised by the bailee under a general contract of
bailment is fixed by law, the obligations of the parties under a special contract of bailment are fixed
primarily by the terms of the contract itself. 8 Am.
Jur. 2d Bailments, §121, p. 1015.
This rule is further stated in 8 Am. Jur. 2d.
Bailments, §137, p. 1032, as follows:
"A bailee may enlarge his legal responsibility for the subject of the bailment by contract, express or implied, eve~ to the. extent
of making himself absolutely liable as msurer
for the loss or destruction of goods committed
to his care· this is true even of gratuitous
bailees. As ~ general rule, if there .is an ~x
press or implied agreement by the bailee which
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cle~rly .goes beyond hi.s ordinary obligah

as implied by law, he will be held to his agrt
ment. I~ such cases the bailment contract
con.trollmg and must be enforced accordir
to its terms, irrespective of the fact that
les.s onerous liability is imposed by law r
bailees of the same class generally."
The special contract of bailment under conside~
ation here expressly provides that "Lessee shall I
liable for all damage to or loss of the equipment Jc
gardless of cause ... " (Exh. p. 1) This provisi~:
allocated between the parties herein which of theL
would bear the risk of loss of the rental equipmen
during the interval of time during which the appt\
lant had exclusive control of the bailed article.
Applying the general rule stated above to tb
contract in the instant case requires that appellanfi
duty with respect to damage to the mortar mixeri,
established by the terms of the written contract o:
bailment, and that defendant is liable to plaintiff fa
the damage thereto.
Such an allocation is a reasonable object of con·
tract, since a bail or, after delivering a chattel to a
bailee, no longer has possession and control of t~al
chattel, and is in no position to examine the artlclt
bailed, and cannot, therefore, rectify any discover·
able defects after it has left his possession.

B. The contract provision in question does_ 1101
violate public policy. The defendant has attack~d t.h'.
contractual clause which is relied upon by plamtift
.
· enl
to recover for the damage done to h is
eqmpm
as being contrary to public policy since, as contendea
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by defendant, this contract, if enforced would have
.
'
relie,·ed plaintiff of a duty of care which plaintiff
owed to the general public. In support of this argument, he cites the following cases: Union Pacific
Railroad Company v. El Paso Natural Gas Company,
17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P. 2d 910; Hunter v. American
Rental Inc., 371 P. 2d 131 (Kan.); Otis Elevator Co.
1'. Mal'yland Casualty Co., 33 P.2d 97 4 (Colo.).
Clearly, none of these cases can be held to stand for
the proposition that it is violative of public policy
for a bailor of equipment to contract with a bailee
of that equipment for the bailee to become absolutely
liable to insure that the article which is bailed will
be returned in the same condition in which it left
the bailor's possession. These cases can only be construed to hold that it may be violative of public policy
to allow a negligent party to a contract to exonerate
himself from a duty of care owed to the public where
his negligence results in damage to the non-negligent
contracting party, or to some third party, and which
negligence is not specifically anticipated by the contract under consideration. This is especially true in
the Union Pacific Railroad Company case, supra, in
which the plaintiff sought indemnification from the
owner of a pipeline from a claim for damages asserted by the estate of an employee of the pipeline
company killed in a collision with one of the railroad
company's trains while the employee was on route
to do maintenance work on the pipeline. The court
there held that the provision in the written contract
betwPPn the parties whereby the pipeline compa~y
Promised to indemnify the railroad from any hab1l-
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ity for injury_ to any person, where such injury aro~
out of_ the ex1s_tence of the pipeline, did not proiit
the
. railroad with a cause of action against the pirr
1me
company for the type of loss involved. Becalli
the collision occurred 1¥2 miles from the location 1
the pipeline, the court held that there was no cau~,
connection between the collision and the pipelin,
and stated:
"The fair import of the entire provisiol
considered together in context as it should~
is that the damages guaranteed against shoul
have at least some causal connection with tr
construction, existence, maintenance or Of·
eration of the pipeline other than an incider
which happened merely coincidental to it'
existence."
That case, therefore, cannot be held to mean thd
any contract which would insure against the negl
gence of one of the parties thereto will violate pubt
policy, and the court, in its opinion, implies that sue
a contract would guarantee against certain damagr
which have a causal connection with the subject mat
ter of the contract. Clearly there is no such causati~'.
problem in the instant case, as the type of dama11
done to plaintiff's equipment was precisely the Bf
of injury anticipated by the agreement between tt
parties. The Union Pacific Railroad case is, thel'r
fore, inapplicable to the case at bar.
Hunter v. American Rentals, Inc., supra, is al~
not in point since that case dealt only with ~n a'
tempt by a bailor to avoid liability for his negligent'
by relying on exculpatory clauses in the contract~
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bailment, where the damage involved was extensive
personal injury to the bailee and damage to the
bailee's personalty. This far-reaching type of indemnification is not what is being sought by plaintiff in this action. The only loss that occurred in the
instant case was the damage done to plaintiff's mortar mixer, the bailed chattel, and this damage occurred while the mortar mixer was in the possession
of the defendant. Defendant suffered no damage at
all to his person or property, and plaintiff is only
seeking to assert the contractual provision in the
agreement by which defendant bound himself to become absolutely liable for any damage done to plaintiff's mortar mixer while it was in defendant's
possession.
Neither is plaintiff seeking to require defendant
to indemnify him for damage done to third parties
by reason of some negligence committed by plaintiff,
as was the situation in Otis Elevator Company v.
Maryland Casualty Company, supra. That case dealt
with an attempt by a negligent party to relieve himself of his duty to the public where third parties were
injured due to that negligence. A different issue
altogether would be presented by the instant case
if the assumed negligence of plaintiff had resulted
in injury to another vehicle on the highway or even
to defendant's vehicle. To prevent such negligence,
it might be proper to hold that an attempt to relieve
oneself by contract from a duty owed to the public
does violate public policy. However, where the only
damage done is to plaintiff's equipment while it is
still in the hands of the defendant, such public policy
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?learly does not apply since no publicly protec1,
mterest has been invaded. Therefore, the allocatir
by contract of the burden of the risk of loss of
bailed chattel is a legitimate object of contract, ar.
should be upheld even against the asserted defo,,
that the loss was proximately caused by the ne~
gence of the bailor. Indeed, the public policy of fr~
dom of contract is best served by enforcing sucn
provision, Weik v. Ace Rents, 87 N.W. 2d 3!
(Iowa), and the contract provision in issue he!
should be enforced.

C. Defendant's liability with respect to ti
bailed chattel is explicitely stated in the contrar

Finally, defendant argues that the language useoi
the disputed contractual provision did not specifici
ly include the words "including negligence of n
lessor" and was, therefore, not explicit enough'.
advise defendant that his liability extended to tk
degree. While, as a general rule, such contracts m
strictly construed, the court in Griffiths v. Broderfr:
27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18, 175 A.L.R. 1, stalt
that express words against negligence need not I•
used, and that if it is clear from the language USi
that the parties intended to cover losses arising fro:
the negligence of the indemnitee, this is sufficien
It is difficult to see how more comprehensive 1
inclusive language could have been used than wori
which stated: "Lessee shall be liable for all darna1
to or loss of equipment regardless of cause." (Err
phasis added.) If plaintiff had used the phrase ' h
eluding negligence of the lessor" in the contract, thi
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it might be open to question whether the provision

ras limited to liability only for such negligence as
1ras stated by the court in General Accident Fire
&Life Assurance Corporation v. Sniith & Oby Company, 272 F. 2d 581, 77 A.L.R. 2d 1134.
The obvious intent of the provision in question
cl~arly and unmistakably makes the defendant absolutely liable as insurer for the loss or destruction
of the equipment which was committed to his care.
To hold otherwise would be to render the words
"regardless of cause" devoid of any rational interpretation.
1

POINT II
APPELLANT SEEKS ON APPEAL RELIEF
KOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF REVIEW OF THE
SUPREME COURT.
Although appellant fails to pray in his brief
for any relief from the Court, nevertheless, if the
statement under the heading RELIEF SOUGHT ON
APPEAL (Appellant's Brief p. 1) constitutes a
prayer for relief, such relief is not available to appellant on this appeal insofar as he prays for a judgment in his favor, or for a new trial.

A. The granting or denial of a motion for a new
trial is not a final judgment from which an appeal
lies. The foregoing proposition is supported in Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d 736;
Klinqe v. Southern Pacific Company, 89 Utah 284,
5i P.2d 367; 4 Arn. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error § 123,
p. 638. Defendant's appeal, then, is properly taken
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only from the judgment in the instant case , and nr
from the Order denying his motion for a new tria.
~n appeal from a denial of a motion for a new bi
is proper only where the lower court has abused i1
discretion in denying or granting the moving part·:
motion. Crellin v. Thornas, 122 Utah 122 ' 247 p'9...,
264. Defendant has not contended in his Brief tha
the trial court abused its discretion in denying fil
motion for a new trial and consequently appel!an·
is not entitled to any relief from this Court by reasor
of the lower court's denial of that motion.
_

B. Plaintiff's negligence and the cause of dam.
age to plaintiff's chattel are not issues before tlii
Court. In POINT I of his Brief, appellant attempt;
to establish, on the basis of allegations contaim~
in his Answer to plaintiff's Complaint, and his Af.
fidavit in support of his motion for a new trial, tho
plaintiff was negligent in attaching the morta1
mixer to defendant's vehicle, and that such negli·
gence was the proximate cause of the damage to ili1
mixer. The lower court, however, in holding defen~·
ant liable as a matter of law, assumed, as is stat~
above, that plaintiff was negligent, and that sucl.
negligence was the proximate cause of such damagt
Appellant's recital of the contents of Title 41-~
148.40 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (obviously en·
acted by the Legislature for the protection of th1
public, a fact which appellant states in the headini
to POINT I of his brief), is irrelevant to the issui
before the Court, i.e., the enforceability of the por·
tions of the rental contract set forth above sine,
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the trial court had no need to consider the issues of
negligence and causation. The most that could be
granted defendant on this appeal is a remand for
trial on the issue of his asserted defense that plaintiff negligently attached the mortar mixer to defendant's vehicle, and that the negligence of plaintiff was the proximate cause of the damage to the
mortar mixer, and this can only be granted in the
event this Court reverses the trial court's holding
that the contract between the parties is determinatiYe of defendant's liability.
Therefore, the Supreme Court on this appeal
can neither render judgment for defendant, nor
grant him a new trial.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the contract
provision in question does provide for absolute liability on the part of defendant for the damage done to
plaintiff's mortar mixer while in the possession of
defendant, that such provision is valid and that it
should be enforced according to its terms.

Respectfully submitted,
R. WILLIAM BRADFORD
JOHN M. BRADLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
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